Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights (Javier Cembrano, Svenja M. Griesbach, and Maximilian J. Stahlberg)
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 12(3):10:1–10:22, 2024.
@article{CembranoGriesbachStahlberg2024,
author = {Javier Cembrano and Svenja M. Griesbach and Maximilian J. Stahlberg},
title = {Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
year = {2024},
volume = {12},
number = {3},
pages = {10:1--10:22},
doi = {10.1145/3677177},
arxiv = {2310.14991},
}
In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size $k$ among a group of $n$ is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is \emphimpartial if no agent can influence its own chance of being selected by changing its vote. It is \emph$\alpha$-optimal if, for every instance, the ratio between the votes received by the selected subset is at least a fraction of $\alpha$ of the votes received by the subset of size $k$ with the highest number of votes. We study deterministic impartial mechanisms in a more general setting with arbitrarily weighted votes and provide the first approximation guarantee, roughly $1/\lceil 2n/k\rceil$. When the number of agents to select is large enough compared to the total number of agents, this yields an improvement on the previously best known approximation ratio of $1/k$ for the unweighted setting. We further show that our mechanism can be adapted to the impartial assignment problem, in which multiple sets of up to $k$ agents are to be selected, with a loss in the approximation ratio of $1/2$.
Book Embeddings of $k$-Framed Graphs and $k$-Map Graphs (Michael A. Bekos, Giordano Da Lozzo, Svenja M. Griesbach, Martin Gronemann, Fabrizio Montecchiani, and Chrysanthi Raftopoulou)
Discrete Mathematics, 347:113690, 2024.
@article{BekosLozzoGriesbach+2024,
author = {Michael A. Bekos and Giordano Da Lozzo and Svenja M. Griesbach and Martin Gronemann and Fabrizio Montecchiani and Chrysanthi Raftopoulou},
title = {Book Embeddings of $k$-Framed Graphs and $k$-Map Graphs},
journal = {Discrete Mathematics},
doi = {10.1016/j.disc.2023.113690},
volume = {347},
issue = {1},
pages = {113690},
year = {2024},
}
An embedding of a graph in a book, called book embedding, consists of a linear ordering of its vertices along the spine of the book and an assignment of its edges to the pages of the book, so that no two edges on the same page cross. The book thickness of a graph is the minimum number of pages over all its book embeddings. For planar graphs, a fundamental result is due to Yannakakis, who proposed an algorithm to compute embeddings of planar graphs in books with four pages. Our main contribution is a technique that generalizes this result to a much wider family of nonplanar graphs, namely to $k$-map graphs. In fact, our technique can deal with any nonplanar graph having a biconnected skeleton of crossing-free edges whose faces have bounded degree. We prove that this family of graphs has book thickness bounded in $k$, and as a corollary, we obtain the first constant upper bound for the book thickness of optimal $2$-planar graphs.
Information Design for Congestion Games with Unknown Demand (Svenja M. Griesbach, Martin Hoefer, Max Klimm, and Tim Koglin)
AAAI 2024 – Proc. 38th Annual Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 9722–9730.
@inproceedings{GriesbachHoeferKlimm+2024,
author = {Svenja M. Griesbach and Martin Hoefer and Max Klimm and Tim Koglin},
title = {Information Design for Congestion Games with Unknown Demand},
booktitle = {AAAI 2024 – Proc. 38th Annual Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2024},
pages = {9722--9730},
doi = {10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28830},
}
We study a novel approach to information design in the standard traffic model of network congestion games. It captures the natural condition that the demand is unknown to the users of the network. A principal (e.g., a mobility service) commits to a signaling strategy, observes the realized demand and sends a (public) signal to agents (i.e., users of the network). Based on the induced belief about the demand, the users then form an equilibrium. We consider the algorithmic goal of the principal: Compute a signaling scheme that minimizes the expected total cost of the induced equilibrium. We concentrate on single-commodity networks and affine cost functions, for which we obtain the following results. First, we devise a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the case that the demand can only take two values. It relies on several structural properties of the cost of the induced equilibrium as a function of the updated belief about the distribution of demands. We show that this function is piecewise linear for any number of demands, and monotonic for two demands. Second, we give a complete characterization of the graph structures for which it is optimal to fully reveal the information about the realized demand. This signaling scheme turns out to be optimal for all cost functions and probability distributions over demands if and only if the graph is series-parallel. Third, we propose an algorithm that computes the optimal signaling scheme for any number of demands whose time complexity is polynomial in the number of supports that occur in a Wardrop equilibrium for some demand. Finally, we conduct a computational study that tests this algorithm on real-world instances.